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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to present the different approaches to demonopolisation 
used in Polish and European urban public transport, compare the efficiency of these 
models which have proven popular in Poland as well as to estimate the total losses 
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incurred due to the high monopolisation of Polish public transport. The methodology 
of the research is based on econometric modelling (Stochastic Frontier Analysis) and 
on a survey conducted by the author among Public Transport Authorities.
The author proves that the modern London model (competition for the market) is 
more efficient in Polish conditions than the classic German one (communal monopoly). 
The very popular in Poland combination of the two above formulas – the co-existence 
of a Public Transport Authority with a monopolistic publicly owned operator – is 
surprisingly the least efficient. Total losses due to the existence of monopolies in Polish 
urban bus transport are estimated for the year 2007 at the level of 10-14% of its 
total budget (ca. 117-149 m EURO/year). In some cities, the losses can be as high 
as 20-25% of the total remuneration to the public bus operator. In others, public 
monopolists can be as efficient as private operators in the competitive model.
Résumé
Le but de cet article est de présenter les approches différentes vers la demono-
polisation du transport en commun urbain polonais et européen, comparer 
l’efficacité de ces modèles, populaires en Pologne, aussi qu’estimer les pertes totales 
résultant de la monopolisation du transport en commun en Pologne. La méthode 
de l’analyse est fondée sur la modélisation économétrique (Stochastic Frontier 
Analysis) et sur l’enquête réalisée par l’auteur parmi les autorités responsable 
de transport. L’auteur prouve que le modèle moderne de Londres (concurrence 
pour le marche) est plus efficace dans les conditions polonaises que le modèle 
allemand (monopole communal). La combinaison de deux modèles, très populaire 
en Pologne, reposant sur la coexistence d’une autorité responsable de transport 
avec un opérateur publique, est une solution la moindre efficace. 
Classifications and key words: public transport; demonopolisation; Stochastic 
Frontier Analysis.
I. Introduction
Polish public transport has become in 1990 one of the duties of the newly 
created communes (local councils) that have generally become the owners 
of public transport operators1. Since then, each of the communes has the 
freedom to choose how to organise its public transport services in order to 
ensure their high quality and efficiency.
This approach created a great variety of organisational models in Polish 
public transport – from a fully communal monopoly to fully competitive models 
1 Act of 8 March 1990 on Communal Government (Journal of Laws 1990 No. 16, item 95, 
as amended).
VOL. 2011, 4(5)
ESTIMATION OF LOSSES DUE TO THE EXISTENCE OF MONOPOLIES… 135
– their presentation is the first of the aims of this paper. Presented also will be 
international experiences which have clearly inspired the chosen solutions.
The variety of urban transport models used in Poland makes it possible to 
compare the efficiency of particular systems implemented in similar circumstances 
– the subject matter of the Author’s doctoral dissertation entitled ‘Economic 
efficiency of urban transport demonopolization in Poland’2. The presentation 
of the outcomes of this comparison is the second aim of this paper.
The de-monopolization process has currently stopped because of political 
reasons hence monopolies – at least in parts of the network – still exist 
in the majority of Polish cities. This paper’s third aim is to estimate the 
losses incurred due to the existence of monopolies on the basis of three 
detailed case studies of Polish metropolises. Nationwide losses will also be 
estimated.
The paper is divided into five parts, including this one. Key international 
model of public transport organisation are presented in part two. The Polish 
approach, which in many cases differs from the original model and is also 
often based on a number of hybrid solutions, is described in details in part 
three.
The fourth part presents the applicable method of econometric modeling, 
created for the purpose of the aforementioned dissertation, based on Stochastic 
Frontier Analysis – a state-of-the-art method of efficiency measurement. This 
part presents also the general assessment results focusing on the comparison 
between different organizational schemes.
Part five aims to estimate current loses associated with the existence of 
communal monopolies which still are the dominant form of public transport 
in Poland.
II. Regulatory concepts in public transport
1. German model
The German regulatory model of public transport represents the most 
‘classical’ solution in this field. It is based on the monopoly of a publicly owned 
operator (called ‘internal operators’3 by EU law, referred to in this paper also 
2 M. Wolański, Efektywność ekonomiczna demonopolizacji komunikacji miejskiej w Polsce, 
Warszawa 2011.
3 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1370/2007 of 23 October 2007 on public passenger transport 
services by rail and by road and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) Nos 1191/69 and 1107/70, 
OJ [2007] L 315.
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as the ‘communal operators’). Such a company is responsible for network 
planning as well as the execution of transport services. Its supervision by local 
authorities is based on very general performance indicators although the 
current trend is to tighten controls over such monopolies because of, among 
other things, the influence exercised in this field by EU law that demands a 
higher precision of service contracts4.
The German model has been popular since the beginning of the 20th century 
after the nationalisation of the initially privately owned tramway operators. 
Between the 1950’s and 1980’s, it was the only model of public transport used 
in Europe in practice.
Until now, this model is widespread in Germany (with some exceptions, e.g. 
Frankfurt) as well as Spain, Hungary, Italy, Czech Republic etc. In some cases, 
private companies are used by the monopolists as sub-contractors who execute 
a proportion of the services or provide drivers. This model is very popular in 
bigger German cities, such as Berlin, Dresden and Düsseldorf because it helps 
decrease personnel costs seeing as different labour law regimes apply there to 
public and private sectors.
More about the newest developments with respect to the German model 
can be found, among other things, in an extensive study of world experiences 
in public transport organisation prepared by van der Velde5. German authors 
focus recently more on describing newer developments than on the classic yet 
still mainstream model6.
2. French model
The French model is based on ‘competition for the market’ whereby the 
subject of the tender usually concerns both: the management of the entire 
network as well as the provision of transport services – for a limited period 
of time. In many cases, the successful operator uses publicly owned depots 
and buses, a solution that aims to decrease costs (local government is usually 
able to get cheaper financing) and increase competition by lowering market 
entry barriers.
This model is widespread mainly in France but a similar formula is also 
used in Dutch regional bus transport.
Theoretically, the French model can be called a monopoly (one operator 
per city). In practice however, both in France and in the Netherlands, the 
4 Ibidem.
5 D. van der Velde et. al., Contracting in urban public transport, inno-V, Amsterdam 2008.
6 A. Beck, ‘Experiences with Competitive Tendering of Bus Services in Germany’ (2010) 
Transport Reviews 1–27.
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French model is much closer to an oligopoly than to a monopoly because 
of the limited number of companies operating nationwide that take part in 
each tender (Transdev, Veolia and Keoils in France – Connexion, Arriva 
and Veolia in the Netherlands). With proper anti-monopoly solutions that 
decrease market entrance barriers (such as a limit on buses covered by one 
tendering lot), the French model can even resemble competition, as shown 
by the experiences of New Zealand. Nevertheless, competition is difficult to 
achieve in this framework because small and medium enterprises (SMEs) 
might find it hard to survive after they fail to win a contract. 
More detailed, up-to-date study of the French model is provided among 
others by D’arcier7.
3. London model
The London model is popular since the late 1980’s/early 1990’s. It is 
based on the division of the network into a number of bundles, tendered 
separately between operators. The network is coordinated by a Public 
Transport Authority (PTA) with a varying scope of responsibilities depending 
on the city in question. Usually, PTA supervision over the operators is much 
stricter than that exercised by public bodies in other public transport models. 
A PTA is responsible also for lines tendering and sometimes, it even retains 
infrastructure ownership (for example: the Stockholm PTA owns bus and 
rail transport infrastructure as well as underground and light railway rolling 
stock).
The London model is common in the metropolises of Northern Europe 
such as London, Stockholm and Copenhagen but it is also used in Frankfurt. 
A very similar model is in operation in regional railway transport of some 
European countries, especially Germany and the UK.
The London model is potentially much closer to competition than any of 
the other organisational solutions. The high number of tenders in each city 
as well as the relatively small size of the tendering lots makes it possible for a 
number of smaller companies to co-exist. Still, the structure of the market is 
often closer to an oligopoly than competition because of the existence of 3–5 
big transport companies dominating the national market. From another point 
of view, potential or actual competition from SMEs forces even multinationals 
to behave as if the market was fully competitive, rather than oligopolistic. 
7 B. D’arcier, How to Improve the Financial Situation of Urban Public Transport? The 
French Case. 11th Conference on Competition and Ownership in Land Passenger Transport 
Proceedings, Delft 2009.
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That is so especially if the PTA continues to ensure that entry barriers 
remain low.
4. British model 
The classic British model is widespread since the mid 1980’s in the UK, 
except London. Unlike all of the aforementioned formulas, it is based on pure 
‘in the market’ competition (‘on the road’). As a result, there can be more 
than one operator in each city (usually two but their number is not prescribed 
by law), usually serving similar networks of lines.
The operators are partially co-ordinated by local authorities. It is the role 
of the latter to contract public service routes (i.e. those that are not profitable 
for the operators), take care of fare integration (the operators can apply their 
own fares, cheaper than the integrated ones) and social discounts.
In practice, the British model does not lead to perfect competition but to 
the creation of local duopolies instead. Entry barriers remain relatively high 
because in order to remain competitive for ‘season’ tickets buyers, a new 
operator needs to be able to offer a full network of bus routes, rather than a 
single line only.
Wider description of both the British and the London model can be found 
in the work of White8 for instance. 
III. Public transport regulatory solutions in Poland
Before 1990, public transport companies were government-owned in Poland 
as there were no local authorities. Shortly after the creation of the communes 
between 1990 and 1993, three main organizational concepts of public transport 
were developed across the country:
• in most cities, former state-owned enterprises were converted into 
budget enterprises9 that managed and provided transport services in a 
comprehensive way in line with the German model;
• in some cities, those budget enterprises were quickly transformed into 
commercial law companies with the same scope of powers as their 
predecessors;
8 P. White, Public transport. Its planning, management and operation, London, New York 
2002.
9 Budget enterprise (in Polish: zakład budżetowy) forms a part of a local authority (without 
its own legal personality) with its own income and expense budget.
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• as early as 1992-1993, a few local authorities established a Public 
Transport Authority (PTA) based on the London model; similarly to the 
initial restructuring stage in London or Copenhagen, PTAs were initially 
contracting services mainly with their municipal operators that received 
a fixed fee for serving given bus routes according to a given timetable; 
soon after, PTAs began to outsource some lines to private companies 
also.
Private carriers were permitted to operate independent lines with their 
own fares (including discounts) and timetables. Usually, they had their own 
buses although in Katowice, for example, the city rented 5 public buses to 
an independent entrepreneur who could freely choose the routes which he 
wished to serve. 
Subsequently, two main trends were observed dating back to the beginning 
of the transformation era:
• some cities preserved the municipal monopoly according to the German 
model, usually restructuring their transport companies and transforming 
them from budget enterprises into commercial law companies;
• other cities decided to create a PTA, generally in the form of a budget 
entity10 and to contract-out to private operators (via a tender) usually 
a minor part of the network, divided into a number of separate 
tendering lots (usually between 1 and 50 lots), according to the city and 
particularities of a given tender.
Depending on tender specifics and market entry barriers, the particular 
segments of the Polish urban bus transport market became either competitive 
or oligopolistic. In general, the market is relatively competitive because it is 
not dominated by multinationals. A number of SMEs (e.g. Warbus Warszawa, 
DLA Wrocław, GRYF Kartuzy, IREX Sosnowiec, ITS Michalczewski Radom, 
PKS Grodzisk Mazowiecki) compete with the multinationals (mostly Veolia 
and Israeli Egged) as well as with each other in a number of tenders not 
limited to ‘home cities’ only.
In Poland, PTAs usually fulfill the following tasks:
• managing the network (including full time-tabling);
• line tendering, quality control and rewarding the operators;
• the issue, control and sales of tickets;
• marketing.
A growing number of local authorities including Cracow, Poznan, Olsztyn 
or Rzeszow have recently decided (in particular since 2008) to create a PTA, 
moving away from the earlier use of the classic German model. However, the 
10 Budget entity (in Polish: jednostka budżetowa) forms a part of a local authority (without 
its own legal personality) without its own income or expense budget (it works within the general 
budget of the local authority).
YEARBOOK OF ANTITRUST AND REGULATORY STUDIES
140  MICHAŁ WOLAŃSKI
responsibilities of the new PTAs often do not include time-tabling or ticket 
sales; they usually co-operate with the internal operator only or tender a very 
small part of the network only.
Many of the older PTAs have also recently decided to stop tendering and 
to increase the use and role of their internal operators. There are three main 
reasons for this:
• the great strength of the labor unions of internal operators, in connection 
with the wealthy financial situation of local authorities;
• the ease with which EU projects can be implemented by internal 
operators11;
• EC Regulation No. 1370/200712 and the later Polish Act on Public 
Transport13, which were often understood as a special ‘permission’ for 
not tendering public transport services as well as an obligation to create 
PTAs (the latter is especially a misinterpretation).
In some Polish cities, usually small towns, urban public transport was 
served over the last two decades entirely by a private company, the winner 
of a tender. Although this solution resembles the French model, buses, their 
depots and other infrastructure are not supplied by the local authority – the 
operator must provide them independently.
Aside from the aforementioned solutions, some Polish cities also tried 
to implement a fully deregulated and competitive public transport system, 
partially inspired by the British model and partially by liberal thoughts. A very 
radical example of such an approach is delivered by the city of Zakopane 
where public transport is provided by small, independent buses; lines run 
usually on demand only and solely in the daytime; and there are no monthly 
tickets. In fact, this formula is closer to the Russian or Ukrainian solutions 
than to the British model. In other cities, commercial lines play an auxiliary 
role. Nowadays however, many such enterprises are being eliminated due to 
rising labor and fuel costs.
The table below shows the main organizational models of urban bus 
transport in Poland. 
11 R. Tomanek, B. Mazur, Raport na temat wsparcia dla sektora transportu publicznego 
w ramach programów operacyjnych współfinansowanych ze środków Unii Europejskiej, Katowice 
2009, pp. 19–21.
12 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1370/2007 of 23 October 2007.
13 Act of 16 December 2010 on Public Collective Transport (Journal of Laws 2011 No. 5, 
item 13).
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IV. Efficiency comparison of different solutions
1. Method
The efficiency measurement model used in this paper is based on an 
analysis of the cost of purchase or production of a ‘bus-kilometre’ in different 
towns. It is consistent with other Polish research, among others, the work of 
R. Tomanek14. The most important novel aspect of the method used in this 
analysis is the consideration of the fact that cost differentiation may result 
from many other factors besides the organizational model used in any given 
city including determinants such as vehicle type, its size, age and equipment.
The cost-based approach is reasonable because in the majority of Polish 
towns it is the public side that determines qualitative aspects of the carriage 
offer, preparing at least a time-table outline, putting forward specific quality 
requirements and finally, shaping the pricing policy. Therefore, a public body 
usually ‘buys’ bus-kilometres and makes its own decisions concerning their use. 
The quality of this use, that is, adapting the offer to the needs of the market, 
does not directly result from the operator’s ownership issues.
The disadvantage of this analytical approach is the impossibility to take 
into account those Polish cities where local governments settle the accounts 
with their transport operators on a net basis (the operator gets actual income 
from ticket sales and a fixed subsidy). Nevertheless, only very few cities use 
the latter solution and it is thus possible to assume that their exclusion from 
this analysis would not lead to statistically significant results.
Using the cost-based approach, it is appropriate within the scope of 
modeling to use Stochastic Frontier Analysis (hereafter: SFA). This is a 
state-of-the art parametric method of efficiency analysis that has been used 
before in transport for benchmarking of the performance of British railways15. 
This method has also been used in Poland for efficiency benchmarking of 
libraries16 and electricity distribution sector17. Nevertheless, SFA has not been 
14 R. Tomanek, Konkurencyjność transportu miejskiego, Katowice 2002.
15 A. Smith, P. Wheat, A quantitative study of train operating companies cost and efficiency 
trends 1996 to 2006: Lessons for future franchising policy, London 2007.
16 J. Osiewalski, A. Osiewalaska, ‘Ocena efektywności kosztowej bibliotek akademickich na 
podstawie danych przekrojowo-czasowych’ (2003) 628 Zeszyty Naukowe Akademii Ekonomicznej 
w Krakowie 13.
17 J. Nazarko, J. Chrabołowska, ‘Benchmarking w ocenie efektywności krajowych spółek 
dystrybucyjnych energii elektrycznych’ [in:] K. Jajuga, M. Walesiak (eds), Taksonomia 12, 
Klasyfikacja i analiza danych – teoria i zastosowania, Wrocław 2005, pp. 26–38.
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used in urban public transport before18. Wider review of economic efficiency 
measurement methods is given by Coelli et al19.
SFA is based on the assumption that the cost function may be defined by 
an equation:
yi = β 'xi + vi + ui
where in this case:
• y – the cost of a bus-kilometre for given services; 
• β 'x – parameters of a given transport service (such as bus length, age, 
etc.), multiplied by their estimated influence on costs (negative or 
positive);
• v – random variable with normal distribution, showing different kinds 
of objective cost deviations, not providing for inefficiency but resulting 
from factors not included in the model; 
• u – inefficiency, a random variable with half-normal distribution, thus 
accepting only non-negative values.
The first element denotes the deterministic part of the cost, which together 
with v, creates the so-called cost frontier (an ideal minimum cost). After its 
deduction, each observation is characterized by non-negative inefficiency u20. 
The variable u in this paper is defined as ‘absolute inefficiency’ in contrast 
to ‘relative inefficiency’ denoted by:
ui
β 'xi
Therefore u itself illustrates the value of inefficiency expressed in currency 
(PLN – Polish zloty). On the other hand, ‘relative inefficiency’ is a non-
dimensional value showing inefficiency in relation to the deterministic element 
of the cost frontier. As a result, relative inefficiency amounting to 24% means 
that – excluding the random element v – the real remuneration paid to the 
operator equals 124% of the deterministic element of the cost frontier, while 
relative inefficiency equaling 50% means that the remuneration equals 150% 
of this element.
18 Some similar studies has been conducted at the same time, especially in Germany, but 
did not consider such a complex sample containing both tendered and directly awarded services 
– for example M. Walter, Some Determinants of Cost Efficiency in German Public Transport, 
11th Conference on Competition and Ownership in Land Passenger Transport Proceedings, 
Delft 2009.
19 T. Coelli, D. Pasada Rao, C. O’Donnell, G. Battese, An Introduction to Efficiency and 
Productivity Analysis, Springer, New York 2005.
20 Ibidem.
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W. Greene21 stresses that as a rule, especially in the case of the classic 
Cobb-Douglas’s production function, particular explanatory variables (xi) may 
denote logarithms of particular inputs. The choice of parameters of vector ß 
is estimated by using the method of maximum likelihood, so that the most 
probable set of values has been chosen. For a simplification maximum log-
likelihood formula has been used:
ln maxlnL y f y
t
n
i
1
"; ;b bR=
=
^ ^h h
An essential advantage of using SFA is the possibility of taking into account 
that not each variation from the forecasted value means inefficiency, which 
is ensured by the random variable v. It should be remembered however when 
using SFA that defined coefficients ß do not mean average dependence, 
because the deterministic element of the equation is closer to the ‘ideal’ than 
to a ‘typical case’, as for example in the case of linear regression. 
In order to carry out the research, first set out was a list of potential 
variables explaining the price of a bus-kilometre or the ability to differentiate 
the effectiveness of transport contracts, such as the vehicle’s age or size, the 
period of the contract, average speed on given routes etc.
The necessary data that made it possible to create a database for the 
model was then collected later. Some data was taken from a statistical 
journal published by the Polish Chamber of Urban Transport (IGKM)22 – 
this information was available only in the case of carriers operating without 
the PTAs. The remaining data was collected from a questionnaire conducted 
in the first half of 2008 and directed to all Polish PTAs that were members of 
IGKM as well as to some other smaller transport authorities.
The database record was a single value of dependent variable, that is, a 
gross price expressed in PLN per kilometer, paid to the operato r by its PTA 
(adjusted by the municipal company’s profit or loss), or an average cost of 
performing a service in a municipal company acting in an organizational model 
without a PTA (German model). This value might refer to the whole network 
or even to a single service. Therefore, it was necessary to weight the data 
implicitly using the number of services that the given rate concerned. The 
term service is in principle understood as one bus in motion, although in 
some cases, it is possible for one vehicle to perform two services obtained in 
different bids (e.g. daytime and night lines) but this is a very rare occurrence. 
A database was created covering 281 transport service rates – therein, 
transport services were provided for 12 PTAs by 4002 buses. The above 
21 W. Greene, op. cit., pp. E33-4.
22 (2007) 2 Komunikacja miejska w liczbach.
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information was complemented by secondary data for operators acting without 
a PTA in 18 additional towns that together run 1546 buses on an average 
working day. The difference of scale was unavoidable as it resulted from the 
specifics of the Polish de-monopolization process of urban transport. 
An assumption of creating two models has been adopted on account of 
the diversity of the dependent variables in the case of towns where transport 
services are performed directly by public companies (without PTAs) and towns 
where transport authorities exist (with PTAs). Accordingly:
• the first general model concerns all towns irrespective of whether a 
transport authority exists or not;
• the second model relates solely to contracts concluded within tenders by 
operators and transport authorities (irrespective of their organizational 
form – this criterion should be treated as functional), where a set of 
potential dependent variables may be somewhat larger.
In practice, these two models emerged as much more similar than expected. 
Nevertheless, their separation was maintained in order to obtain more precise 
results. 
2. Results
2.1. Created models
Three statistically significant models were ultimately created: one concerned 
the whole scope of the scrutinized services; the remaining two referred only to 
transportation tasks granted in the course of a tender (not covered by this paper).
Table 2. Stochastic bus-kilometre cost frontier – all service
Variable Value Standard deviation / error Significance level
Cost / price of vehiclekm [PLN]
(dependent variable) 5.448 1.272 -
Constant 3.750 0.536 0.0000
Average length of a bus [m] 0.130 0.016 0.0000
Average log of bus age [years] –1.038 0.302 0.0146
Annual bus mileage [km/year] –0.007 0.002 0.0006
Share of low floor buses [%] 0.641 0.153 0.0016
Average speed (incl. stops) [km/h] –0.027 0.015 0.0000
Model paramters
Log-likelihood value –405.45 – –
Likelihood ratio test result (λ) 3.296 0.479 0.0000
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The obtained general model is presented in the following table. All shown 
relations are significant at 0.0146 level or less, what mea ns reliability level 
of 98.54% or more. The Likelihood test ratio shows, that the model itself 
is statically significant with reliability of over 99.9% (compared with a null 
model).
Trials with both linear and logarithmic dependence were simultaneously 
conducted for some variables – the chosen ones guaranteed higher reliability. 
Logically correct and statistically significant dependencies were not found in 
any of the models between cost and, among other things:
• the size of an order granted to a given operator – in this case, an inverse 
proportionality was even observed in a parallel linear regression model 
potentially at least because the setting of the cost frontier was obstructed 
by the existence of groups of big and inefficient public operators; it must 
be stressed however that a similar proportionality was already observed 
by D. Miller23;
• the amount of the average wage in a given region – this is logical, as the 
average wage can vary more between regions than between the wages of 
the drivers because of differences in the professional structures of the 
inhabitants of various regions (for example, the average wage is high in 
Katowice because of the high pay in the mining industry; the average 
pay is also high in Warsaw because of high wages in private corporations 
accumulated therein, this does not greatly influence labour costs of 
drivers or generally workers);
In order to get statistically significant models, it was also necessary to give 
up the assumed weights in the form of the number of services and to substitute 
them by a logarithm of the same value.
2.2. An analysis of efficiency of organizational models
The created models make it possible to draw a number of important 
conclusions. First of all, the comparison of relative efficiency depending 
on the organizational scheme employed in different regions with respect to 
the ownership structure of the operator and award type (compare graph 1) 
indicates a much higher efficiency of private entities and those public operators 
that gain contracts by way of a tender than of the remaining public companies. 
It must be kept in mind though that in the following graph:
• a scheme with a PTA, public (internal) operator and the direct award 
of transport services contracts – refers to a Polish hybrid model, a 
23 D. Miller, ‘Differences Among Cities, Differences Among Firms, and Costs of Urban 
Bus Transport’ (1970) 1 The Journal of Industrial Economics 22-32.
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communal monopoly as in the German model with a separated PTA as 
in the London model; 
• a scheme with a PTA, a public operator and the tender – can mean a very 
similar situation as the above (when the tendering requirements are from 
the start more favourable to the internal operator and usually only one 
bid is placed), as well as (in minor cases) a system resembling the London 
model, in which the communal operator succeeds; initially, the Author 
wanted to differentiate those two cases but within the surveys very few 
PTAs answered the questions concerning the number of bids placed;
• both schemes with private operators – refers to the London model (direct 
awards of transport services contracts for the private operators were 
possible before 1997 according to the old Public Procurement Act);
• the last scheme means a pure German model.
As mentioned above, other schemes couldn’t be included, as they occur 
very rarely.
It can be concluded that if a public operator gains a contract by way of a 
tender in areas supervised by a PTA, the cost is 12% lower than the cost of 
a direct award of a transport contract (an average cost equalling 129% of the 
cost frontier instead of 146% of the cost frontier).
Graph 1.  Relative inefficiency according to the organizational scheme, operator 
ownership & award type
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If a private operator wins the tender, the cost is on average lower again by 
another 2%. In the case of private operators who received contracts under 
the direct award procedure, attention should be drawn to the small number 
of their services. Also relevant here is the fact that these orders were placed 
in the mid 1990’s, when the Public Procurement Act was not yet in force. 
Still, those contracts were preceded by negotiations. Hence, the efficiency of 
private operators should be considered jointly, on the assumption that they 
were chosen in a competitive manner in both cases.
Surprisingly, public companies operating without a PTA are much more 
efficient than those operating within a PTA direct award procedure despite 
the fact that a part of the competences and costs are taken over by PTAs. This 
means that the most popular form of transport organization in Poland is the 
least efficient one as it results from an ‘artificial’ establishment of PTAs, which 
are anyway forced to outsource the transport services of a particular operator 
and have limited influence on them. Clearly, this is merely a confirmation 
of how things are in most cases. In theory, and in some practical cases, it is 
possible to establish healthy relations between a PTA and the operator, as 
between a normal customer and a seller – the possibility of external quality 
control is an essential advantage in such cases.
Graph  2.  Absolute inefficiency according to organizational scheme, operator 
ownership & award type
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The situation looks somewhat different if absolute efficiency expressed in 
Polish zlotys is considered (comp. graph 2, 1 PLN ≈ 4.0 EUR). In this case, 
the difference between efficiency of private and public operators receiving 
contracts by way of a tender becomes more pronounced. This discrepancy 
may be the result of a number of issues: 
• private operators provide services with a lower cost frontier and thus of 
lower quality (e.g. older bus fleet) or on more advantageous conditions 
(e.g. longer-term contracts or higher yearly mileage);
• public operators provide twice as many services won in the course of 
a tender than private operators, a realisation that can be attributed to 
the fact that private operators can find it difficult to satisfy the criteria 
of a certain number of tenders (e.g. bus fleet ownership requirement 
applicable at the moment of the tender); this causes an ‘overvaluing’ of 
the cost frontier in case of specific contracts for public operators.
Also of relevance is the fact that some municipal operators provide services 
both on the basis of direct awards and tenders – in this case, higher incomes 
from direct awards may allow them to offer lower prices in tenders, a practice 
that creates an illusory efficiency of the latter. This realisation has been proven 
by an analysis of single operators.
It is also worth paying attention to the fact that the shown bus-kilometre 
cost of public operators does not illustrate the entire costs incurred by local 
authorities, including costs of lost opportunities to which the author had no 
access. For example, private operators purchase or lease land on their own 
while municipal operators may use plots contributed to the company by the 
relevant town.
Some interesting data is also provided by comparing the efficiency of private 
and public operators within the range of individual towns (comp. graph 3). 
It clearly shows the diversity of absolute inefficiency between the scrutinised 
cities as well as local differences between private and public operators.
Graph 3. Relative inefficiency in subsequent cities
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Private operators were more expensive than the public one in one town 
only (No: 13). However, the former held a mere 0.5% of the market share in 
this town at the time and serviced a very specific segment of the market. Their 
market presence has now significantly increased since they clearly won against 
the public operator in two big tenders, conducted in 2008.
Graph 4. Distribution of relative inefficiency – private vs. public
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Graph 4 conveys well the diversity in the efficiency level of private as opposed 
to public operators. It shows that: if in the case of private operators over 75% of 
their tasks reach an inefficiency level not exceeding 30%, almost 70% of public 
operators exceed this value. Still, there is a group of communal operators who 
maintain very high efficiency, a fact worth stressing especially because in some 
cases, they have a wider scope of tasks (there is no separate PTA). 
V. Estimation of losses nationwide and in selected cities
1. City X
It is possible on the basis of the above research to estimate the losses resulting 
from the monopolisation of public transport in selected Polish cities. The first 
case study concerns City X24 where the majority of the bus transport market is 
restricted to the internal operator, in other words, a typical case of a monopoly.
24 The names of the cities are not stated in this paper because the estimations are based on 
confidential data; City X, Y and Z are however among 5 biggest Polish cities.
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The rest of the market is tendered according to the London model – over 
5 bids are usually placed in each tender also by companies that do not already 
operate in city X seeing as entry barriers remain low (no excessive tender 
requirements). This makes this market segment closer to perfect competition 
than to an oligopoly, which is typical for the sector.
In City X, the difference in efficiency between the public and private 
operators easily shows the losses of the monopoly because all of the operators 
act in very similar conditions.
The relative inefficiency of the public operator amounts to 60% while 
private entities reach a mere 27%. This indicates that if the services that are 
delivered by the public bus operator were to be subject to a tender, a saving 
of over 26% would be possible. In other words: 26% of the total bus transport 
budget in City X remains a monopoly premium for the internal operator.
Considering absolute inefficiencies –the difference amounts to 1.52 PLN/
vehicle-km (0.38 EUR/vehicle-km – 2.53 PLN/0.63 EUR for public, 1.01 
PLN/0.25 EUR for private). Compared with the price of a vehicle-km paid to 
the public operator (ca. 7.40 PLN/vehicle-km, so 3.70 EUR/vehicle-km), this 
leads to the conclusion that the cost level of this particular internal operator 
is over 20% higher than the cost of private operators in the same region.
Moreover, the aforementioned losses are somewhat underestimated 
because of a number of considerations that separate the public and private 
operators in this city:
• the public operator uses bus depots free of charge from the city while 
private entities must buy/rent them under normal market conditions;
• only the employees, and their families, of the public operator can use 
public transport free of charge;
• the share of dead runs is higher for private operators than for the public 
one.
Therefore, if it is impossible to restructure the internal operator in City X, 
the market should be tendered as soon as possible because of excessive costs 
for the community25.
2. City Y
The internal operators in the following two cities – City Y and City Z – had 
a full monopoly in 2007 (a pure German model). Both operators were at that 
time responsible for network planning as well as the execution of transport 
services.
25 The legal aspects of this situation are not the subject of this paper.
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In the city Y – the rate per vehicle-km equalled ca. 5.80 PLN (1.45 EUR) 
with an inefficiency of 1.52 PLN (0.38 EUR). This gives a relative inefficiency 
of 36%.
Thus, the relative inefficiency of the internal operator in City Y is not much 
higher than the relative inefficiency of private operators in City of X (27%). 
In fact, it is not much higher than the average inefficiency of public transport 
operators nationwide (25% see graph 2). The difference of 8% is fully justified 
because City Y has no PTA. Its costs (e.g. time-tabling, bus stops maintenance 
etc.) usually amount to 5-8% of the public transport budget, are in this case 
included in the operator’s costs.
This example proves that public monopolies are not always worse than 
private operators. A detailed analysis can show that monopolists have on 
the one hand slightly higher administration and labour costs than private 
operators, but on the other hand, they can save money thanks to efficient 
network planning.
These include measures such as shorter stops at terminals, e.g. the PTA of 
City X (previous example) can plan a timetable for a bus running 60 minutes 
with a waiting time of 30 minutes at the bus terminal – totally unnecessary 
rule especially during the weekends with their lesser traffic. Seeing as a PTA 
does not cover the additional costs of long stops and only pays the operator a 
fixed fee for each vehicle-kilometer, this approach is neutral for the operators 
short term but obviously generates additional costs in the system long term. 
This problem does not arise in City Y (this case) where real costs – rather 
than a lump sum – are considered at the stage of time-tabling.
3. City Z
City Z was in 2007 very similar to city Y but its absolute inefficiency equalled 
2.125 PLN/vehicle-km (0.53 EUR/vehicle-km) and its relative inefficiency was 
51%. This is an example of one of the least efficient internal operators in the 
German model. This means, that the costs of the public operator in City Z 
are 20%-25% higher than the costs of the purchase of the same services from 
a private operator.
Taking into account the higher scope of the competences of the internal 
operator in City Z, the above difference is overestimated and is in fact probably 
between 15% and 20% - still a relatively high difference.
A detailed analysis showed that the internal operator of City Z has a much 
lower budget discipline than its counterpart in City Y. It also does not benefit 
from integrated services planning (e.g. as opposed to City Y) whereby one bus 
usually serves only one line per day – making City Z similar to City X.
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The Cities Y and Z show two different starting points to the potential 
process of de-monopolisation – while it can be potentially successful in City 
Z, private operators probably will not bring great savings for City Y.
In fact, both of these cities created a PTA after 2007 but have not tendered 
many of their routes – a fact that could have a negative influence on the 
economic efficiency of the public transport system especially in City Y. Simple 
observation of cost changes in these cities proves that the costs seem to increase 
faster than the quality of services but this hypothesis needs further research.
4. Nationwide
The nationwide estimation of loss will be based on the average between 
weighted absolute inefficiencies of private (0.643) and monopolistic public 
operators (i.e. direct award – 1.678). This difference amounts to 1.035 [PLN/
vehicle-km], so 0.259 [EUR/vehicle-km].
According to the data available from the main Polish statistical office GUS 
(in Polish Glowny Urzad Statystyczny), at least 782 million bus-kilometres were 
driven in 2007 in Polish urban public transport26. Assuming that its communal 
monopolies had a 67.5% market share – the loss associated with their existence 
can be estimated at ca. 466 million PLN (ca. 115 million EUR).
Compared with the general budget of Polish public bus transport of 4,250 m 
PLN or 1,063 m EUR(782 m vehicle-km multiplied by 5.45 PLN or 1.36 EUR/
vehicle-km), this equates to over 10% of the entire Polish public transport 
budget.
The overall losses can be even higher seeing as the above estimates do 
not include communal operators which won contracts by way of a tender. In 
fact, the communal operator was often the only participant of these tenders 
because their requirements included the need to own a bus depot in the given 
city or a precisely described bus fleet. Alternatively, public operators could 
win the bid because they were able to offer lower prices since their fixed costs 
were covered by other contracts.
Taking into account the difference between all public and private operators, 
the former have an 86% market share and a cost difference of 0.883 PLN or 
0.221 EUR/vehicle-km (1.526 - 0.643 in PLN). That gives a total loss of almost 
595 m PLN/ year (it equals to almost 149 m EUR and 14% of the entire bus 
public transport budget).
It should be stressed however that the above estimation covers urban bus 
transport only. Other kinds of collective passenger transport in Poland (urban 
26 Transport – wyniki działalności 2007 , Warszawa 2008, p. 171.
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and regional rail transport, regional bus) are also highly monopolised and 
similar monopoly losses can occur also there.
VI. Conclusions
The conducted analysis leads to the following conclusions:
• the efficiency of monopolistic public bus operators is highly differentiated 
– some of them are as efficient as private operators acting in a pro-
competitive model – others have costs of up to 25% higher than similar 
private entities;
• the hybrid model (a PTA with an internal operator, that is, vertical 
disintegration with no competition between operators), despite its great 
popularity in Poland, even growing since 2007, has generally proven to be 
the least efficient model of urban public transport seeing as it disintegrates 
the planning process and does not bring any benefits for competition;
• nationwide losses due to the existence of monopolies in Polish public bus 
transport in 2007 are estimated at the level of 10-14% of its total budget 
(ca. 466-595 m PLN/year or 117-149 m EUR/year); this number might 
have even risen since this date because of the popularity growth of the 
least efficient organisational model as well as the generally increasing 
budgets in public transport.
Literature
Beck A., ‘Experiences with Competitive Tendering of Bus Services in Germany’ (2010) 
Transport Reviews 1–27.
Coelli T., A guide to FRONTIER version 4.1, Armidale 1996.
Coelli T., Pasada Rao D., O’Donnell C., Battese G., An Introduction to Efficiency and 
Productivity Analysis, Springer, New York 2005.
D’arcier B., How to Improve the Financial Situation of Urban Public Transport? The French 
Case, 11th Conference on Competition and Ownership in Land Passenger Transport 
Proceedings, Delft 2009.
Greene W,. Limped version 9.0, Econometric modelling guide, vol. 2, Plainview 2007.
Greene W., Econometric Analysis, 7th Edition, Prentice Hall 2011.
Komunikacja miejska w liczbach [Public Transport in Numbers](2007) 2.
Miller D., ‘Differences Among Cities, Differences Among Firms, and Costs of Urban Bus 
Transport’ (1970) 1 The Journal of Industrial Economics.
Nazarko J., Chrabołowska J., ‘Benchmarking w ocenie efektywności krajowych spółek 
dystrybucyjnych energii elektrycznych’ [‘Benchmarking in efficiency assessment 
YEARBOOK OF ANTITRUST AND REGULATORY STUDIES
156  MICHAŁ WOLAŃSKI
of domestic electricity distribution companies’] [in:] K. Jajuga, M. Walesiak (eds), 
Taksonomia 12, Klasyfikacja i analiza danych – teoria i  zastosowania [Taxonomy 12. 
Classification and data analysis – theory and application], Wrocław 2005.
Osiewalski J., Osiewalaska A., ‘Ocena efektywności kosztowej bibliotek akademickich na 
podstawie danych przekrojowo-czasowych’ [‘Efficiency assessment of academic libraries 
based on cross-sectional time-series data’] (2005) 628 Zeszyty Naukowe Akademii 
Ekonomicznej w Krakowie/
Smith, P. Wheat, A quantitative study of train operating companies cost and efficiency trends 
1996 to 2006: Lessons for future franchising policy, London 2007.
Tomanek R., Konkurencyjność transportu miejskiego [Competitiveness of public transport], 
Katowice 2002.
Tomanek R., Mazur B., Raport na temat wsparcia dla sektora transportu publicznego 
w  ramach programów operacyjnych współfinansowanych ze środków Unii Europejskiej 
[Report on the support for public transport sector within EU co-financed operational 
projects], Katowice 2009, p. 19–21.
Velde van der D. et. al., Contracting in urban public transport, inno-V, Amsterdam 2008.
Walter M., Some Determinants of Cost Efficiency in German Public Transport. 11th Conference 
on Competition and Ownership in Land Passenger Transport Proceedings, Delft 2009.
White P., Public transport. Its planning, management and operation,London, New York 2002.
Wolański M., Efektywność ekonomiczna demonopolizacji komunikacji miejskiej w Polsce 
[Efficiency of demonopolisation of urban public transport in Poland], Warszawa 2011.
